The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12

Hello friends, in today’s article, we see The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12, this chapter is all about the margin of safety while you invest in the stock market. so let’s understand this concept in the author’s words.

Previous Chapter 11

Dhandho 401: Margin of Safety – Always

The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12

In this chapter, the author refers the Benjamin graham’s book, the intelligent investor, the key idea of investing, and also the importance of the Margin of Safety. the author also gives examples of Warren Buffett’s investments.

so let’s understand it

the author says, ” Mr. Buffett hosts business school students from over 30 universities every year. The schools represent a wide range from Harvard and Yale to the University of Tennessee and Texas A&M.

the students get to ask him questions on almost any subject for over an hour before heading out to have lunch with Mr. Buffett at his favorite Steakhouse.

virtually every group asks Mr. Buffett for Book Recommendations. Mr. Buffett’s Consistent Best Book recommendation for several decades has been Benjamin Graham the “Intelligent Investor”

As he stated to students from Columbia Business in Omaha, Nebraska On March 24, 2006

The Intelligent Investor is still the best book on Investing, it has only three ideas you read need

  • Chapter 8 – the Mr. Market analogy. Make the Stock Market Serve you. the C section of the Wall Street Journal is my business broker it quotes me prices every day that I can take or leave and there are no called strikes.
  • A stock is a piece of a business. Never forget that you are buying a business that has an underlying value based on how much cash goes in and out.
  • Chapter 20 – Margin of Safety, Make sure that you are buying a business for way less than you think it is conservatively worth.

— Warren Buffett

Graham’s perspective on the importance of the margin of safety seems pretty straightforward and simple. recall that Einstein’s five ascending levels of intellect were ” Smart, Intelligent, Brilliant, Generous, simple.”

When we buy an asset for substantially less than what it’s with, we reduce downside, risk, Graham’s Genious Was that he fixated on these two joint Realities.

  1. The bigger the discount to intrinsic value the lower the risk.
  2. the bigger the discount to intrinsic value, the higher the return.

Then the author talks about, papa Patel and Manilal and Branson’s Dhandho with Margin of safety

the author says, ” Papa Patel, & Manilal have likely never heard of Benjamin-Graham. Branson too has likely never read any of Graham’s books.

Their Dhandho journeys have always been all about the Minimization of risk. They’ve always fixated on the seemingly bizarre notion of ” the lower the risk, the higher the rewards.” (The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12)

Most of the top-ranked business schools around the world do not understand the fundamentals of margin of safety or Dhandho. for them, low risk and low returns go together as do high risk and high returns.

Over a lifetime, we all encounter scores, of low-risk, high-return bets. they exist in all facets of life. Business schools should be educating their students on how to seek out and exploit these opportunities.”

then the author gives, the example of Margin of Safety

the author says, ” One of the most vivid examples of margin of safety at work in the equity markets is Warren Buffett.

Observations about his purchase of the Washington Post in 1973.

We bought all of our { Washington Post ( WPC)} holding in Mid-1973 at a price of not more than one-fourth of the then per-share business value of the enterprise.

Calculating the price/value ratio required no unusual insights, most security analysts media, brokers, and media executives would have estimated WPC’s intrinsic business value at $400 to $500 million just as we did, and if $100 million stock market valuation was published daily for all to see.

Our Advantage, rather, was attitude; we had learned from Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large discount from underlying business values.

— Through 1973, and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a business, and its intrinsic value grew. Nevertheless, by year-end 1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25% with a market value of $8 million against our cost of $106 million. (The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12)

What we had bought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC stock down to well below 20 cents in the dollar of intrinsic value.

….. Warren Buffett

then author explains, how warren Buffett, gets this company at discounted prices

the author says, ” As inside, Mr. Buffett hasn’t sold a single share a Washington Post over the past 30 years of holding the stock.

that’s original $10.6 million dollar investment is now worth over $1.3 billion over 124 times the original investment. the Washinton post pays a modest dividend, now paid by the past to Berkshire Every year, exceeding the Amount Mr. Buffett paid for the stock in the first place.

Why was the Washinton Post Trading at such a large discount to intrinsic value in 1973/1974?

Mr. Buffett goes on to offer an explanation. Most institutional investors in early 1970, on the other hand, regarded business value as only mirror relevance when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or sell.

this now seems hard to believe however these institutions were then under the spell of academics at prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly fashioned theory;

the stock market was totally efficient and therefore calculations of business value and even thought, itself, were of no importance in investment activities.

Warren Buffett says, ” We are enormously indebted to those academics what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest – whether it be a bridge, chess, or stock selection than have opponents who have been taught that thinking is a waste of energy?”

Over the past 20 years, there hasn’t been much change in the thinking of institutional investors with regard to market efficiency as stated by charlie Munger when speaking at the 2004 Wesco annual meeting.

Charlie Munger:- Very few people have adopted our approach… maybe two percent of people will come into our corner of the tent, and the rest of the ninety-eight percent will believe what they’re been told ( p.g. that markets are totally efficient.)

It is instructive to note that Mr. Buffett bought his Washinton post stake at a 75% discount to intrinsic value.

As Benjamin Graham told Senator Fulbright, all discounts, to intrinsic value eventually lose.

Mr. Buffett knew that this gap was likely to close in a few years, whenever I make investments, I assume that the Gap is highly likely to close in three years or less. (The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12)

My own experience as a professional investor over the past seven years has been that the vast majority of gaps close in under 18 months.

Mr. Buffett has his Washinton Post stake for about $6.15 per share in $25 per share. let’s assume that the Washington Post got to at least 90% of its intrinsic value increased by a modest 10% a year.

So, in 1976, the business would be worth over $33.28 per share ( $25 * 1.1 * 1.1* 1.1), and 90% of that is about $30. If a person bought the Stock in 1973 and sold it in 1976, the annualized return would be about 70% a year. Let’s the kelly Formula and this one, let’s assume the following conservative odds.

Odds of making 4 times or better return in three years – 80%

Odds of making 2 times to 4 times or better return in three years  – 15%

Odds of Breakeven to 2 times – 4%

Odds of a Total loss  – 1%

In this case, the Kelly formula suggests that an investor bet 98.7% of the available bankroll on this mouthwatering opportunity.

At the time, Berkshire Hathaway had a total market capitalization of about $60 million.

Available cash was likely a small fraction of this member. I’d estimate that Mr. Buffett likely used well over 25% of hrs available bankroll on this bet.”

then author explains, Graham’s Fixation on the Margin of Safety

author says, ” Graham’s fixation on the Margin of Safety is understandable. Minimizing downside risk while maximizing the upside is a powerful concept. It is the reason Mr. Buffett has a net worth of over $40 Billion. he got there by taking minimal risk while always maximizing returns.

Most of the time, assets trade hands at or above their intrinsic value. the key, however, is to wait patiently for that super-fast pitch down the center. (The Dhandho Investor:- Chapter 12)

it is during times of extreme distress and pessimism that rationality goes out the window and prices of certain assets go well below their underlying intrinsic value.

Extreme Distress can be caused by macro-events like 9/11 or the Cuban Missile Crisis. or they can be company-specific- for example, Tyco’s Stock Price collapse during the Dennis Kozlowski Corruption Scandal. We can not predict which asset classes are likely to get distressed next. however, if we only focus on a single asset class of Stocks, that encompasses thousands of businesses.

Virtually every week, specific businesses that trade on public markets see their prices collapse. At other times it might be an entire sector that gets written off. More rarely it might be an entire market sells off due to a macro-shock like 9/11

Papa Patel, Manilal, Branson, Graham, Munger, and Buffett have always fixated on a large Margin of Safety and gone to great lengths to seek out low-risk, high-return bets.

it is truly a fortunes’ Formula.”

So this is all about the Dhandho Investor Chapter 12.

The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11

Hello friends, in today’s article, we see The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11 Summary. this chapter is all about fixating on Arbitrage. so let’s understand, how value investors can take benefit from this arbitrage.

Previous Chapter 10

Dhandho 302:- Fixate On arbitrage (Chapter 11)

The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11

In starting the author explain, what is the arbitrage, and how value investor take benefit from that

the author says, ” Arbitrage is a powerful construct and a fundamental tool in the arsenal of any value investor. with arbitrage, we get decent returns with virtually no risk.

The elimination of downside risk, even if the upside is limited, is awesome -& that is exactly what arbitrage gives us. With arbitrage, the appeal is ” Head, I win: Tails, I breakeven or win!”

Although many different forms of Arbitrage exist, compare these four:

1) Traditional Commodity Arbitrage:-The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11

in this, the author explains, Commodity Arbitrage

the author says, ” If gold is trading in London at $600 per ounce and is changing hands at $610 per ounce in new york city, an arbitrageur can buy in London and immediately sell in new york capturing the spread.

Over time, these trades will lead to the special being dramatically narrowed or eliminated.

2) Correlated Stock Arbitrage:-

In this arbitrage, the author gives the example of Berkshire Hathway

the author says, ” Berkshire Hathaway has two Classes of -BRK-A and BRK-B – which trade on the New York stock exchange ( NYSE). BRK-B is economically worth 1/30 of BRK of BRK-A.

One BRK-B share has 1/200 the voting rights of a BRK-A share. so it is slightly inferior as it has less than one-sixth of the voting power for the same dollar and invested, other than that, these two stocks are virtually identical. also, since Mr. Buffett, these close friends have large enough BRK-A Holdings. (The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11)

To control the company, these voting rights differences are mostly irrelevant. BRK-A shares can be converted into BRK-B shares at the discretion of the holder at any time however, the holder can not do the reverse.

Based on these facts, these two stocks should trade in lockstep with each other- or perhaps BRK-B ought to trade at a very slight discount due to its inferior voting rights and one-way conversion features.

However, the reality is different. As figure 11.1 shows, during a recent 3 month period. BRK-B traded mostly at a discount to BRK-A for a few weeks and then traded at a premium for a few weeks.

On some days, the two stocks, differed by up to 1 percent. Assuming minimal frictional costs an arbitrageur could endeavor to capture that spread.

This type of arbitrage exists in a variety of stocks, sometimes holding company stocks, trade at a discount to a sum of the parts even if the parts are individually publically traded.

sometimes the same stocks on different exchanges can have price differences. Closed-end-funds from time to time trade at significant discounts to their underlying assets, all are candidates for arbitrage plays.”

then author explains the merger arbitrage, between two companies

3) Merger Arbitrage:-

the author says ” Public company A announces it is to buy public company B for #15 a share, prior to the announcement B was trading at $10 a share; immediately after the announcement B goes to $14 a share.

if an investor buys B at $14 and holds the Stock until the deal closes; then the $1 spread can be captured for a tidy profit in a few months. (The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11)

However, there is always some risk that the deal does not close. In that case, Company B’s Stock price might head back down to $10 ( or lower). Unlike other forms of arbitrage discussed earlier, this is not risk-free. this is sometimes called risk arbitrage.

There are well-downside statistics on the percentage of announced mergers that never close. don’t get government approval, don’t get shareholder approval, or the like. if you understand the business and these dynamics, you can handicap the odds of the deal closing and decide to place a bet ( or not ) accordingly.”

then author explains, his famous Dhandho arbitrage

4) Dhandho Arbitrage:-

the author says, ” Virtually all startups engage in Dhandho arbitrage. An example of this is presented in chapter 5.

Our barber set up shop in town C and had a 17-mile arbitrage likely was reduced to a few blocks and the arbitrage mostly disappeared. However, while it lasted, he had Super-normal profits.

He got these profits by taking very little risk. It was low risk and high uncertainty that got him his bounty. the barber is a classic Dhandho arbitrageur.

Head, He wins, Tails, he doesn’t lose much!

the overwhelming majority of entrepreneurs are not risk-takers. they are Dhandho arbitrage players. one of the most vivid examples of this dhandho arbitrage. entrepreneurial journeys is the story of computing, documented by Amar Bhide in his wonderful book ” the origin and evolution of new businesses.”

then the author gives a detailed story,

the author says, ” In 1994, computing, was founded by two 20-year-olds- steve Shevlin and Robert Wilkin.

Shevlin was the main driver of the business. A college dropout, Shevlin, entered the army where he trained and worked as an electronic technician. (The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11)

he didn’t care too much for the military’s uptight attitude. After a brief stint, he left the army. Shevlin was unemployed and without much money. He lived in a tiny studio apartment in Florida.

it was the very early days of the personal computer business, and Shevlin being a hacker type, had a computer and a printer in his studio.

The Ideal setup required the printer to be placed away from the PC and he needed a 20-foot cable to connect them. he went to a shop that sold printer cables and computer accessories and asked if they had the long cable he needed.

at that time, when PCs were very few the interfaces for all these cables were not Universal or standard as they are today. there was a hodgepodge of different cabling and socket standards.

The retailer said he had the cable but it was only seven feet long. he suggested daisy-chaining three cables and adding some special connectors to make it all work.

Shevlin was not happy with the total price or nature of the proposed solution. He went back to his studio and thought about the situation. he come back to the retailer and said that he adds been a tech in the army and knew how to make PC cables.

he offered to make and sell cables in a variety of lengths to the retailer. the retailer said that he was used to getting all sorts of requests for cables of different lengths that he did not have the ability to procure or provide. Nonetheless, the retailer was hesitant about taking inventory risk on unbranded cables as some of the different lengths that he did not have the ability to produce or provide.

Nonetheless, the retailer was hesitant about taking inventory risks and unbranded cables as some of the inventory might become obsolete quickly.

Shevlin offered to give it to him on consignment the retailer said that on a consignment basis, he’d stock anything.

so Shevlin was in business with the first customer lined up. Shevlin and Wilkin carefully noted all the missing cable lengths and connections that people might want. (The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11)

They bought 300 free cables and all the hardware to make the various connectors and want to work.

they made various odd-length cables and delivered them to the retailer who was elated. these cables cost about two to three dollars apiece which was very competitive with the other shorter lengths.

the retailer put them for sale at over $30. everyone was happy with the healthy margins.

They started to get more retailers to carry their cables and sales grew significantly over the next few months. then sales started falling.

The retailer put them for sale at over $30. everyone was happy with the healthy margins.

they started to get more retailers to carry their cables and sale grew significantly over the next few months. then sales started falling. the retailers said that they no longer needed the CompuLink cables as their primary vendor had come up with these lengths, and the incumbent had a better brand and packaging.

Shevlin was very disappointed and spent some time thinking. he realized that PC and printer manufacturers are continuously coming up with new models of printers and new models of computers and other devices that need to be connected.

Every few months, CompuLing changed large portions of this product line as competitors entered the fray. Shevlin was always running about three to six months ahead of his big competitors in intraday cables because he was nimble and focused. the competitors were slower because they were larger companies, and it took time to roll out new products.

Shevlin would get the new cables into distributor channels, scoop, in all the super-normal profits as a monopolist, milk it for three to six months, and then be told that he was either being replaced by the mainstream vendor or had to drop prices.

They did exceptionally well with their lowly Dhandho arbitrage and become an Inc.500 company in 1989- one of the fastest-growing businesses in the United States.

They literally were the Ultimate business arbitrage model- one where supernormal profits were totally free but lasted just a few months.

They were good at dealing with uncertainty, low-risk high uncertainty and arbitrage are the core fundamentals of how good entrepreneurs operate. (The Dhandho Investor Chapter 11)

As computer interfaces began to get standardized computing original arbitrage spread all but vanished. it continued to evolve and always looked to exploit on offering gap.

It did find such a gap in complex cable installation today, CompuLink has 600 employees doing mostly cable installation services.

This spread, too, has narrowed, but in the meanwhile, it has built brand and reputation. it’s likely CompuLink Will continue to strive -at least for several more years before this gap closes.

Due to technology changes or more intense competition. ”

then the author gives the examples of GEICO Insurance, the arbitrage spread is its focus on selling auto insurance policies without agents or a branch office Network.

so this is a summary of chapter 11, from the book ” The Dhandho Investor” written by Mohnish Pabrai